MTRCB v ABS-CBN

Facts:

An episode of “The Inside Story” entitled “Prosti-tuition,” produced by Loren Legarda was aired by ABS-CBN depicting female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved. MTRCB alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and respondents did not submit “The Inside Story” to MTRCB for review and exhibited the same without its permission, violating Sec. 7 of PD 1986, Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter IV of MTRCB Rules and Regulations.

MTRCB declared that all subsequent programs of the “The Inside Story” and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Ch. 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing. On appeal, RTC ruled that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional for violating the freedom of expression and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution

Issue:

Whether or not there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry so as to proceed with the issue on constitutionality.

Held:

No. There is no need to resolve whether certain provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB Rules and Regulations contravene the Constitution. No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry: 1) proper party 2)actual case or controversy 3) question raised at the earliest possible opportunity and 4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The fourth requisite is wanting. MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program nor did it cancel respondents’ permit. The latter was merely penalized for their failure to submit the program to MTRCB for its review and approval. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality is not necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Iglesia ni Cristo v CA

Facts:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office ofthe President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression.

Held:

No. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. 

Social Weather Stations v COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”.

Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press.

Held:

Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

National Press Club vs Comelec

207 SCRA 835

Facts:

R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper, radio, any person making the use of media to sell or give free of charge of space or time for political purpose except COMELEC Petitioners who were representatives of mass media assails its constitutionality on the ground that it amounts to censorship because it single’s out for suppression only publications of a particular content and it abridges freedom of speech of candidates.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 6646 is valid.

Held:

Yes, the law banning political ads has since been repealed but the court made important observation which is still pertinent.

The technical effects of Art. IX (C) (4) of the constitution may be seen to that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercise of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC for the purpose of serving equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in same limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. The applicable issue is the general, time honored are that statute is presumed to be constitutional that party asserting unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincing, proving that assertion.

Section II has not gone outside the permissible brands of supervision and regulation of media operations. During election period Sec. II is limited in duration of applicability and enforceability. Sec. II doesn’t purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers and radio or TV stations on news events relating to qualified political parties.

Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; 2 candidates for office (1 national, 1 provincial) in the coming May 1992 elections; taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

Zulueta v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. Sometime March 26, 1962, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents belonging to private respondent, [i.e. greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, passport, and photographs], Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication/correspondence to be inviolably apply even to the spouse of aggrieved party.

Held:

Yes. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a “lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC

Facts:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640.  YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue:

Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:

Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

People v Albofera

Facts:

Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the killing. The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested. Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.”

Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead. Later the accused were convicted of murder.

Issue: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused privacy.

Held: No, the production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.