MTRCB v ABS-CBN

Facts:

An episode of “The Inside Story” entitled “Prosti-tuition,” produced by Loren Legarda was aired by ABS-CBN depicting female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved. MTRCB alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and respondents did not submit “The Inside Story” to MTRCB for review and exhibited the same without its permission, violating Sec. 7 of PD 1986, Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter IV of MTRCB Rules and Regulations.

MTRCB declared that all subsequent programs of the “The Inside Story” and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Ch. 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing. On appeal, RTC ruled that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional for violating the freedom of expression and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution

Issue:

Whether or not there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry so as to proceed with the issue on constitutionality.

Held:

No. There is no need to resolve whether certain provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB Rules and Regulations contravene the Constitution. No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry: 1) proper party 2)actual case or controversy 3) question raised at the earliest possible opportunity and 4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The fourth requisite is wanting. MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program nor did it cancel respondents’ permit. The latter was merely penalized for their failure to submit the program to MTRCB for its review and approval. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality is not necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Iglesia ni Cristo v CA

Facts:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office ofthe President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression.

Held:

No. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. 

Social Weather Stations v COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”.

Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press.

Held:

Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

National Press Club vs Comelec

207 SCRA 835

Facts:

R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper, radio, any person making the use of media to sell or give free of charge of space or time for political purpose except COMELEC Petitioners who were representatives of mass media assails its constitutionality on the ground that it amounts to censorship because it single’s out for suppression only publications of a particular content and it abridges freedom of speech of candidates.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 6646 is valid.

Held:

Yes, the law banning political ads has since been repealed but the court made important observation which is still pertinent.

The technical effects of Art. IX (C) (4) of the constitution may be seen to that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercise of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC for the purpose of serving equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in same limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. The applicable issue is the general, time honored are that statute is presumed to be constitutional that party asserting unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincing, proving that assertion.

Section II has not gone outside the permissible brands of supervision and regulation of media operations. During election period Sec. II is limited in duration of applicability and enforceability. Sec. II doesn’t purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers and radio or TV stations on news events relating to qualified political parties.

Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; 2 candidates for office (1 national, 1 provincial) in the coming May 1992 elections; taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

Zulueta v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. Sometime March 26, 1962, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents belonging to private respondent, [i.e. greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, passport, and photographs], Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication/correspondence to be inviolably apply even to the spouse of aggrieved party.

Held:

Yes. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a “lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC

Facts:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640.  YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue:

Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:

Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

People v Albofera

Facts:

Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the killing. The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested. Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.”

Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead. Later the accused were convicted of murder.

Issue: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused privacy.

Held: No, the production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.

In Re: Laureta

Facts:

Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1^st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference.

Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.

The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.

Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to “expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.”

True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption.

The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.  They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court.

Issue:

Whether or not the privacy of communication was violated.

Held:

The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.

There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

We’re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustre’s letters, nor with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as “undue influence”, powerful influence” in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustre’s lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.

SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government.

Gaanan v IAC

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

Facts:

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebonoffered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

The lower courtfound both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

Held:

 No, An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favour of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. The mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature.

The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Ramirez v CA

G.R. No. 93833

Facts:

Petitioner filed a civil case for damages against private respondent which petitioner alleged that he was insulted and humiliated by private respondent in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. Petitioners claim was supported by a transcript of the conversation recorded by the petitioner during the said incident. Thus the private respondent filed criminal charges against petitioner because said recording was done through the violation of RA 4200 entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." But the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner stating that the act of the petitioner does not constitute the compliant charge since the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. The respondent appealed to the CA which reverse the ruling of the lower court and ruled in favor of the private respondent thus the petitioner appealed to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not taping of communication by one of the parties in a conversation covered by RA 4200.

Ruling:

Yes, the court said the language of the assailed law is clear and unambiguous thus no interpretation is needed but the law should be applied. The court said that RA 4200 makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.  

.

           

              

People v Marti

G. R. No. 81561

Facts:

Accused went to the Manila Packing and Export Forwarder to deliver 4 packages to a friend from Zurich. The proprietress ask if she could inspect the package but the accused refuse and assured her that it only contains cigar, books and glove for his friend thus the proprietress did not insist and place the package in a box. Before the package will be forwarded to the Bureau of Custom and Bureau of Post a proprietor standard procedure inspect the package of the accused, upon opening of the said box containing the package a strange scent was smelled by the proprietor thus through his curiosity he squeeze one of the package and was able to obtain its  content. He forwarded the sample that he obtain from the package to the NBI for laboratory test and he was interview by the NBI agents and said he still has the package of the accused. In the presence of the NBI agent he opened the said package and saw bundles of dried leaves which was latter identified as marijuana contained in 4 package. The NBI filed a charge against the accused for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act which he was found guilty by the lower court. The accused now contends that the evidence obtained from the package was illegal as it was a violation of his constitutional right against Illegal searches and seizures and Privacy of communication thus is inadmissible as evidence in court.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused constitutional right against Illegal searches and seizure and Privacy of Communication had been violated.

Ruling:

No, the SC said that in a line of cases which evidence had been obtain through the violation of the said constitutional right against Illegal searches and seizures and Privacy of communication it can be noted that said evidence were obtain by the agent of the state through its law enforcers and other authorize government agency. Thus the case at bar peculiar one since the evidence acquired was procured by a private individual acting in his private capacity. The court said the constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. In the case at bar the search is made at the initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

People v Inting

G.R. No. 88919

187 SCRA 788

Facts:

Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. 

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition. 

Issue:

Whiter or not a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists? 

Held:

The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

People v Delgado

G.R. No. 79672

189 SCRA 715

Facts:

On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually recommended the filing of information against each of the private respondents for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as recommended. 

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court. 

Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court. 

Held:

Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.

Practice of Law

Cayetano v Monsod
G.R. No. 100113 
September 3, 1991

Facts:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent posses the required qualifications of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor, verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Far East Bank and Trust Co v Queremit

G.R. No. 148582

January 16, 2002

Facts:

Respondent Estrella Querimit opened a dollar savings account in FEBTC for which she was issued 4 Certificates of Deposit. In 1989, respondent accompanied her husband to the US for medical treatment. In 1993, her husband died and Estrella Querimit returned to the Philippines. She went to petitioner FEBTC to withdraw her deposit but she was told that her husband had withdrawn the money in deposit. Respondent demanded payment including interests earned. Respondent filed a complaint upon refusal of petitioner to pay. 

The trial court rendered its judgment in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that FEBTC failed to prove that the certificates of deposit had been paid out of its funds. 

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner bank is liable in paying the certificates of deposit without the production of such certificates. 

Held:

Yes. A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgement by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor is created. The principle that payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made to someone authorized to receive it is applicable to the payment of certificates of deposit. 

In this case, the certificates of deposit were clearly marked payable to “bearer”, which means – to the “person in possession of an instrument, document of title or security payable to bearer or indorsed in blank”. Petitioner should not have paid respondent’s husband or any third party without requiring the surrender of the certificates of deposit. The subject certificates of deposit until now remain unendorsed, undelivered and unwithdrawn by respondent Estrella Querimit. 

Petitioner FEBTC thus failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its business. 

Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v CA

G.R. No. 85161

September 11, 1991

Facts:

Respondent and petitioner entered into a lease agreement for the term six (6) years over the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol Theaters and the land on which they are situated. After more than two (2) years of operation, the respondent lessor made demands for the repossession of the said leased properties in view of the Sy's arrears in monthly rentals and non-payment of amusement taxes.

In pursuance of their latter agreement, Sy's arrears in rental were reduced. However, the accrued amusement tax liability of the three (3) theaters to the City Government of Cabanatuan City had accumulated despite the fact that Sy had been deducting the amount of P4,000.00 from his monthly rental. Sy filed the present action for reformation of the lease agreement, damages and injunction and prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to enjoin OVEC from entering and taking possession of the three theaters.

OVEC on the other hand, alleged in its answer by way of counterclaims that by reason of Sy's violation of the terms of the subject lease agreement and became authorized to enter and possess the three theaters in question and to terminate said agreement. The trial court arrived at the conclusions that Sy is not entitled to the reformation of the lease agreement and further concluded that Sy was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction issued in his favor after the commencement of the action and that the injunction bond filed by Sy is liable for whatever damages OVEC may have suffered by reason of the injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not Sy is entitled to reformation of the lease agreement.

Held:

No. The repossession of the leased premises by OVEC after the cancellation and termination of the lease was in accordance with the stipulation of the parties in the said agreement and the law applicable thereto and that the consequent forfeiture of Sy's cash deposit in favor of OVEC was clearly agreed upon by them in the lease agreement. The court found no ambiguity in the provisions of the lease agreement. It held that the provisions are fair and reasonable and therefore, should be respected and enforced as the law between the parties. It held that the cancellation or termination of the agreement prior to its expiration period is justified as it was brought about by Sy's own default in his compliance with the terms of the agreement and not motivated by fraud or greed.

Coronel v Constantino

G.R. No. 121069

February 07, 2003

Facts:

Constantino and Buensuceso filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and damages with prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with against Benjamin, Emilia and John Does alleging that Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo purchased the property belonging to Emilia and her sons by virtue of a deed of sale signed by Emilia and that Santos and Bernardo in turn sold the same to Constantino and Buensuceso by virtue of a compromise agreement and they are the owners of the subject property and defendants have illegally started to introduce construction on the premises in question and therefore praying that defendants respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of the plaintiffs to the share, interest and participation of the one-third (1/3) portion of the property.

Defendants stipulated that the property in question was previously owned by Honoria Aguinaldo, one-half (1/2) of which was inherited by the defendants while the other half was inherited by the plaintiffs from the same predecessor and it was admitted by counsel for the defendants that there was a sale between Jess Santos and the plaintiffs covering the subject property and that there was no evidence presented by either of the parties and that the decision therein was based on a compromise agreement. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs declaring plaintiffs as the sole and absolute owners of the properties.

Issue:

Whether or not herein plaintiffs-respondents are the owners of the subject property.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The subject property was co-owned,pro-indiviso, by petitioner Emilia together with her petitioner son Benjamin, and her two other sons, Catalino and Ceferino. No proof was presented to show that the co-ownership that existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein petitioners has ever been terminated. Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by their mother.

Plaintiffs-private respondents Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso are declared owners of one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the subject property plus the one-fourth (¼) undivided share of defendant-petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel; and, defendant-petitioner Benjamin Coronel together with the heirs of Catalino Coronel and the heirs of Ceferino Coronel are declared owners of one-fourth (¼) share each of the other one-half (1/2) portion of the subject property, without prejudice to the parties entering into partition of the subject property.

Baliwag Transit Inc v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 57493

January 01, 1987

Facts:

Martinez, claiming to be an employee of two bus lines operating under different grants of franchise but were issued only one ID Number: “Baliwag Transit” owned and operated by the late Tuazon and “Baliwag Transit Inc” (BTI) owned by de Tengco, (Martinez) filed a petition with the Social Security Commission to compel BTI to remit his premium contributions to SSS. BTI denied ever employing Martinez, and alleges that he was in fact employed by Tuason who operated a separate and distinct bus line from BTI. The Social Security Commission granted Martinez’s petition. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the commission, finding that Tuason was operating under the kabit system; that while Tuason was the owner and operator, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission in his own name; and thus ordered BTI to remit Martinez’ premiums to SSS.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance by SSS of one ID Number to the two bus lines necessarily indicates that one of them is operating under the kabit system.

Held:

No. The “Kabit System” has been defined by the Supreme Court as an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee.

The determining factor, therefore, is the possession of a franchise to operate which negates the existence of the “Kabit System” and not the issuance of one SSS ID Number for both bus lines from which the existence of said system was inferred.

Thus, it is evident that both bus lines operated under their own franchises but opted to retain the firm name “Baliwag Transit” with slight modification, by the inclusion of the word “Inc.” in the case of herein petitioner, obviously to take advantage of the goodwill such firm name enjoys with the riding public. Conversely, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the late Pascual Tuazon, during the time material to this case operated his buses under the “Kabit System” on the ground that while he was actually the owner and operator, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission (now the Bureau of Land Transportation) in his own name, is not supported by the records.

Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. vs Wearever Textile Mills Inc.,

G.R. No. 58469

May 16, 1983

Facts:
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation covering certain raw materials and machinery. Upon default, Makati Leasing filed a petition for judicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati Leasing’s application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff enforcing the seizure order and removed the main motor of the subject machinery. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery on the ground that the same cannot be the subject of replevin because it is a real property pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from Wearever textile’s plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor. When the motion for reconsideration of Makati Leasing was denied by the Court of Appeals, Makati Leasing elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the parties.

Held:
The said machinery is a personal property. Like what was involved in the Tumalad case, if a house of strong materials, may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon, as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from the denying the existence of the chattel mortgage. The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the order of the lower court was reinstated.

Reyes V CA

G.R. No. 110207

 July 11, 1996

Facts:

Petitioner and respondents entered into a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which subject was a parcel of land was registered in their father’s name. The Deed which allegedly partitioned the subject parcel of land extrajudicially among petitioner and private respondents stated that the latter waived their rights, interest and participation therein in favor of the former and one of the private respondents was given a share of fifty (50) square meters.

Petitioner caused the registration of the alleged instrument managed to obtain 333 square meters in his name and 50 square meters in the name of Paula Palmenco. Having discovered the registration of the said Deed, respondent denied having knowledge of its execution alleged that the subject Deed was fraudulently prepared by petitioner and that their signatures thereon were forged.  

Respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order against petitioner. The lower court ruled that the private respondents' signatures on the questioned instruments were indeed forged and simulated and declared the same as null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the executed Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement is authentic and therefore not been forged and simulated.

Held:

Yes. Petitioners could not have been possessors in good faith of the subject parcel of land and they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which they claim to be the basis for their just title. Having forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of private respondents, petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed containing private respondents' simulated signatures is a nullity and cannot serve as a just title. The signatures that were signed at the bottom page of the instruments appear to have been written by one and the same hand and not by individual signatories and that no such documents were notarized by a certain Atty. Jose Villena was ever recorded nor was Atty. Villena officially appointed as Notary Public for and in Pasay City on the aforesaid date.