Far East Bank and Trust Co v Queremit

G.R. No. 148582

January 16, 2002

Facts:

Respondent Estrella Querimit opened a dollar savings account in FEBTC for which she was issued 4 Certificates of Deposit. In 1989, respondent accompanied her husband to the US for medical treatment. In 1993, her husband died and Estrella Querimit returned to the Philippines. She went to petitioner FEBTC to withdraw her deposit but she was told that her husband had withdrawn the money in deposit. Respondent demanded payment including interests earned. Respondent filed a complaint upon refusal of petitioner to pay. 

The trial court rendered its judgment in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that FEBTC failed to prove that the certificates of deposit had been paid out of its funds. 

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner bank is liable in paying the certificates of deposit without the production of such certificates. 

Held:

Yes. A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgement by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor is created. The principle that payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made to someone authorized to receive it is applicable to the payment of certificates of deposit. 

In this case, the certificates of deposit were clearly marked payable to “bearer”, which means – to the “person in possession of an instrument, document of title or security payable to bearer or indorsed in blank”. Petitioner should not have paid respondent’s husband or any third party without requiring the surrender of the certificates of deposit. The subject certificates of deposit until now remain unendorsed, undelivered and unwithdrawn by respondent Estrella Querimit. 

Petitioner FEBTC thus failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its business. 

Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v CA

G.R. No. 85161

September 11, 1991

Facts:

Respondent and petitioner entered into a lease agreement for the term six (6) years over the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol Theaters and the land on which they are situated. After more than two (2) years of operation, the respondent lessor made demands for the repossession of the said leased properties in view of the Sy's arrears in monthly rentals and non-payment of amusement taxes.

In pursuance of their latter agreement, Sy's arrears in rental were reduced. However, the accrued amusement tax liability of the three (3) theaters to the City Government of Cabanatuan City had accumulated despite the fact that Sy had been deducting the amount of P4,000.00 from his monthly rental. Sy filed the present action for reformation of the lease agreement, damages and injunction and prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to enjoin OVEC from entering and taking possession of the three theaters.

OVEC on the other hand, alleged in its answer by way of counterclaims that by reason of Sy's violation of the terms of the subject lease agreement and became authorized to enter and possess the three theaters in question and to terminate said agreement. The trial court arrived at the conclusions that Sy is not entitled to the reformation of the lease agreement and further concluded that Sy was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction issued in his favor after the commencement of the action and that the injunction bond filed by Sy is liable for whatever damages OVEC may have suffered by reason of the injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not Sy is entitled to reformation of the lease agreement.

Held:

No. The repossession of the leased premises by OVEC after the cancellation and termination of the lease was in accordance with the stipulation of the parties in the said agreement and the law applicable thereto and that the consequent forfeiture of Sy's cash deposit in favor of OVEC was clearly agreed upon by them in the lease agreement. The court found no ambiguity in the provisions of the lease agreement. It held that the provisions are fair and reasonable and therefore, should be respected and enforced as the law between the parties. It held that the cancellation or termination of the agreement prior to its expiration period is justified as it was brought about by Sy's own default in his compliance with the terms of the agreement and not motivated by fraud or greed.

Coronel v Constantino

G.R. No. 121069

February 07, 2003

Facts:

Constantino and Buensuceso filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and damages with prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with against Benjamin, Emilia and John Does alleging that Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo purchased the property belonging to Emilia and her sons by virtue of a deed of sale signed by Emilia and that Santos and Bernardo in turn sold the same to Constantino and Buensuceso by virtue of a compromise agreement and they are the owners of the subject property and defendants have illegally started to introduce construction on the premises in question and therefore praying that defendants respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of the plaintiffs to the share, interest and participation of the one-third (1/3) portion of the property.

Defendants stipulated that the property in question was previously owned by Honoria Aguinaldo, one-half (1/2) of which was inherited by the defendants while the other half was inherited by the plaintiffs from the same predecessor and it was admitted by counsel for the defendants that there was a sale between Jess Santos and the plaintiffs covering the subject property and that there was no evidence presented by either of the parties and that the decision therein was based on a compromise agreement. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs declaring plaintiffs as the sole and absolute owners of the properties.

Issue:

Whether or not herein plaintiffs-respondents are the owners of the subject property.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The subject property was co-owned,pro-indiviso, by petitioner Emilia together with her petitioner son Benjamin, and her two other sons, Catalino and Ceferino. No proof was presented to show that the co-ownership that existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein petitioners has ever been terminated. Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by their mother.

Plaintiffs-private respondents Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso are declared owners of one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the subject property plus the one-fourth (¼) undivided share of defendant-petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel; and, defendant-petitioner Benjamin Coronel together with the heirs of Catalino Coronel and the heirs of Ceferino Coronel are declared owners of one-fourth (¼) share each of the other one-half (1/2) portion of the subject property, without prejudice to the parties entering into partition of the subject property.

Baliwag Transit Inc v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 57493

January 01, 1987

Facts:

Martinez, claiming to be an employee of two bus lines operating under different grants of franchise but were issued only one ID Number: “Baliwag Transit” owned and operated by the late Tuazon and “Baliwag Transit Inc” (BTI) owned by de Tengco, (Martinez) filed a petition with the Social Security Commission to compel BTI to remit his premium contributions to SSS. BTI denied ever employing Martinez, and alleges that he was in fact employed by Tuason who operated a separate and distinct bus line from BTI. The Social Security Commission granted Martinez’s petition. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the commission, finding that Tuason was operating under the kabit system; that while Tuason was the owner and operator, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission in his own name; and thus ordered BTI to remit Martinez’ premiums to SSS.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance by SSS of one ID Number to the two bus lines necessarily indicates that one of them is operating under the kabit system.

Held:

No. The “Kabit System” has been defined by the Supreme Court as an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee.

The determining factor, therefore, is the possession of a franchise to operate which negates the existence of the “Kabit System” and not the issuance of one SSS ID Number for both bus lines from which the existence of said system was inferred.

Thus, it is evident that both bus lines operated under their own franchises but opted to retain the firm name “Baliwag Transit” with slight modification, by the inclusion of the word “Inc.” in the case of herein petitioner, obviously to take advantage of the goodwill such firm name enjoys with the riding public. Conversely, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the late Pascual Tuazon, during the time material to this case operated his buses under the “Kabit System” on the ground that while he was actually the owner and operator, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission (now the Bureau of Land Transportation) in his own name, is not supported by the records.

Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. vs Wearever Textile Mills Inc.,

G.R. No. 58469

May 16, 1983

Facts:
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation covering certain raw materials and machinery. Upon default, Makati Leasing filed a petition for judicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati Leasing’s application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff enforcing the seizure order and removed the main motor of the subject machinery. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery on the ground that the same cannot be the subject of replevin because it is a real property pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from Wearever textile’s plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor. When the motion for reconsideration of Makati Leasing was denied by the Court of Appeals, Makati Leasing elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the parties.

Held:
The said machinery is a personal property. Like what was involved in the Tumalad case, if a house of strong materials, may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon, as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from the denying the existence of the chattel mortgage. The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the order of the lower court was reinstated.

Reyes V CA

G.R. No. 110207

 July 11, 1996

Facts:

Petitioner and respondents entered into a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which subject was a parcel of land was registered in their father’s name. The Deed which allegedly partitioned the subject parcel of land extrajudicially among petitioner and private respondents stated that the latter waived their rights, interest and participation therein in favor of the former and one of the private respondents was given a share of fifty (50) square meters.

Petitioner caused the registration of the alleged instrument managed to obtain 333 square meters in his name and 50 square meters in the name of Paula Palmenco. Having discovered the registration of the said Deed, respondent denied having knowledge of its execution alleged that the subject Deed was fraudulently prepared by petitioner and that their signatures thereon were forged.  

Respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order against petitioner. The lower court ruled that the private respondents' signatures on the questioned instruments were indeed forged and simulated and declared the same as null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the executed Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement is authentic and therefore not been forged and simulated.

Held:

Yes. Petitioners could not have been possessors in good faith of the subject parcel of land and they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which they claim to be the basis for their just title. Having forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of private respondents, petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed containing private respondents' simulated signatures is a nullity and cannot serve as a just title. The signatures that were signed at the bottom page of the instruments appear to have been written by one and the same hand and not by individual signatories and that no such documents were notarized by a certain Atty. Jose Villena was ever recorded nor was Atty. Villena officially appointed as Notary Public for and in Pasay City on the aforesaid date.

Riviera Filipina Inc. vs. CA

Facts:

Respondent Reyes executed a ten year renewable Contract of Lease with Riviera involving a 1,018 square meter parcel of land which was a subject of a Real Estate Mortgage executed by Reyes in favor of Prudential Bank. But the loan with Prudential Bank remained unpaid upon maturity so the bank foreclosed the mortgage thereon and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction sale. Reyes decided to sell the property offered it to Reviera. After seven months, Riviera offered to buy the property but Reyes denied it and increased the price of the property. Reyes’ counsel informed Riviera that he is selling the property for P6,000 per square meter and to confirm their conversation, Riviera sent a letter stating his interest in buying the property for the fixed and final price of P5,000 per square meters but Reyes did not accede to said price.

Then Reyes confided to Traballo and the latter expressed interest in buying the said property for P5,300 per square meter but he did not have enough amount so he looked for a partner. Despite of the impending expiration of the redemption period of the foreclosed mortgaged property and the deal between Reyes and Traballo was not yet formally concluded, Reyes decided to approach Riviera and requested Atty. Alinea to approach Angeles and find out if the latter was still interested in buying the subject property and ask him to raise his offer for the purchase of the said property a little higher but Riviera said that his offer is P5,000 per square meter so Reyes did not agree.

Cypress and Trading Corporation, were able to come up with the amount sufficient to cover the redemption money, with which Reyes paid to the Prudential Bank to redeem the subject property and Reyes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property. Cypress and Cornhill mortgaged the subject property to Urban Development Bank. Riviera sought from Reyes, Cypress and Cornhill a resale of the subject property to it claiming that its right of first refusal under the lease contract was violated but his attempts were unsuccessful. Riviera filed the suit to compel Reyes, Cypress, Cornhill and Urban Development Bank to transfer the disputed title to the land in favor of Riviera upon its payment of the price paid by Cypress and Cornhill.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner can still exercise his “right of first refusal”.

Held:

No. The held that in order to have full compliance with the contractual right granting petitioner the first option to purchase, the sale of the properties for the price for which they were finally sold to a third person should have likewise been first offered to the former. Further, there should be identity of terms and conditions to be offered to the buyer holding a right of first refusal if such right is not to be rendered illusory. Lastly, the basis of the right of first refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to purchase of any prospective buyer. Thus, the prevailing doctrine is that a right of first refusal means identity of terms and conditions to be offered to the lessee and all other prospective buyers and a contract of sale entered into in violation of a right of first refusal of another person, while valid, is rescissible.